Abstract. Security of sensor networks is a complicated task, mostly due to the limited resources of sensor units. The first line of defense, i.e. encryption and authentication, is useless if an attacker has entered the system, and it is also vulnerable to sidechannel attacks. Thus, a second line of defense, known as Intrusion Detection, must be added in order to detect and eliminate attacks. In the recent past, various solutions for detecting intrusions have been proposed. Most of them are able to detect only a limited number of attacks. Further, the solutions that deploy machine learning techniques exhibit higher level of flexibility and adaptability. Yet, these techniques consume significant power and computational resources. In this work we propose a distributed intrusion detection system organized as a reputation system where the reputation of each node is assigned by selforganizing maps (SOM) trained for detecting intrusions. The response of the system consists in assigning low reputation values to the compromised node rendering them isolated from the rest of the network. Further, we propose the implementation of SOM algorithm using the energy-efficient SORU (Stream Oriented Reconfigurable Unit) co-processor developed by our research group. Our solution offers many benefits: scalable solution, fast response to adversarial activities, ability to detect unknown attacks, high adaptability and energy efficiency. The testing results demonstrate its high potential.
Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) consist of a large number of sensor nodes. These sensor nodes exhibit very limited power and computational resources, small memory size and low bandwidth. The nodes within a WSN are densely deployed in the area or phenomenon to be observed. Dense deployment of the sensors provides high level of redundancy. This means that there exist a number of sensors in a certain zone that should give coherent information, which can serve as a way to discriminate the erroneous nodes.
The most important application areas of WSNs include military control and surveillance, environmental monitoring, health monitoring of patients or assistance to disabled persons, and emerging ambient intelligence. In all of these applications, it is mandatory to maintain the integrity and the correct functioning of the deployed network. Thus, the security of these networks is an important issue.
The most common approach to deal with the security issue is to add an authentication system and encryption to communications. The main drawback of this approach when deployed to WSNs consists in limited resources, which cannot support the execution of complicated encryption algorithms resulting in shorter keys that are easier to discover. What is more, encryption and authentication cannot help in the case of compromised mobile nodes, which often carry private keys that can come into possession of an attacker. Finally, they are vulnerable to side-channel attacks that can be used in order to discover the secret keys.
Another issue in WSNs' security is the impossibility to update hardware and/or software components every time a new vulnerability or potential threat is detected. On the other hand, redundancy helps in maintaining network integrity, but does not detect nor prevent attackers in carrying out their malicious activities. Moreover, redundancy in some cases can be a weak point, for example secure routing using redundancy relies on the credibility of other nodes, which can be used to launch attacks.
Therefore, the main conclusion is that an attacker can always find a weak point to launch his attack, so we need to add a second line of defense that would detect these intrusions and provide appropriate response to their activities. Here we take over the well known term used in network security: intrusion detection systems (IDS). In the same way we define intrusion as a sequence of actions whose main goal is to compromise the integrity, confidentiality and/or availability of a resource (one node, a group of nodes or whole network). Again, we are able to distinguish two types of intrusion detection systems: misuse detection systems, that look for patterns of known attacks or abuse of known weak points, thus able to detect only previously seen attacks, and anomaly detection systems, that look for deviations from established "normal" behavior, thus with the possibility of detecting previously unseen attacks.
IDSs for WSNs have to fulfill certain requirements. The behavior of the system has to be modeled in a way that attack traces are distinguishable from the rest of the data, i.e. traces of "normal" behavior. Apart from this, limited resources of the nodes require deployment of simple algorithms, or the configuration of microprocessor architecture that is capable of executing specified algorithms in an efficient way. Furthermore, an IDS has to be able to function in autonomous way, since in most of the cases no human intervention is possible. Finally, an IDS has to be aware that no node is to be trusted, so the detection algorithms have to be designed in a way that corresponds to this requirement. After having detected an intrusion, an IDS has to be capable of performing the necessary actions in order to mitigate the effect of the detected attack and eventually eliminate it from the network.
Hence, the objective of this work is to design an autonomous IDS that would be able to detect wide range of attacks, including the previously unseen ones. For that reason, we deploy unsupervised selforganizing map (SOM) algorithm that does not have any a priori assumptions whether a node is corrupted or not. Furthermore, it is adaptable to the environment changes, as it takes only to re-train the existing algorithm with new examples of data. The fact that it is unsupervised means that no data preprocessing is necessary.
We further envision a distributed intrusion detection system, given the distributed nature of WSNs. Every node is being examined by an agent that resides on a node in its vicinity and listens to its communication in a promiscuous manner, where the agent executes self-organizing map (SOM) algorithm in order to detect traces of an attack. The system of SOM agents is coupled with a reputation system where each node has its reputation value that basically reflects the level of confidence that others have in it. In our proposal, the output of the SOM agent affects on the reputation system in the way that it assigns lower reputation to the nodes where it detects adversarial activities and vice versa. We further advocate coupling the information provided by the reputation system with the routing protocol in a way that the nodes with low reputation should not be considered as a routing hop and all the information coming from these nodes should be discarded. In this way, the compromised node remains isolated from the network and has no role in its further functioning. Considering that the attacker that has taken over a node can disable or compromise the SOM agent, we introduce agent redundancy: at least two SOM agents will examine the behavior of each node and both will affect on its reputation.
Coming back to the design of SOM agents, the first step in deploying any machine learning technique is to define the model of the phenomenon that is being observed. The model consists of certain number of characteristics, i.e. features that describe all possible aspects of the phenomenon. Furthermore, in our case it is essential to be able to distinguish normal from anomalous behavior. The feature sets deployed in the state-of-the-art mostly include those features whose values are known to change under the influence of an attacker, or are known to be weak spots. Relying on these features only the known attacks or their variations can be detected. Furthermore, it assumes that an attacker can exploit only the known vulnerabilities, but the general experience is that vulnerability is detected after being exploited by an adversary.
In most of the cases the aim of an adversary is to compromise the system. If we consider that the main purpose of WSNs is to observe certain phenomenon by providing information through sensor measurements, it is obvious that the attacker would have to change the values that sensors send to the base station in order to give wrong picture of the phenomenon. Therefore, we believe that modeling the output values of each sensor or groups of sensors will help in detecting anomalies. Here we assume that attacks are special type of anomalies, but not all the anomalies are the result of adversarial activities. For example, sensors can go out of battery and stop sending information.
For that reason, we deploy temporal and spatial models of sensors using n-grams. Temporal model is defined for each sensor, while spatial model considers groups of close sensors. Each n-gram in temporal model consists of a predefined number of successive sensor values, while an n-gram in spatial model consists of outputs of all the sensors that make the group. Therefore, the features are the n-grams and the feature values are the number of occurrences or the frequency of the corresponding n-gram during a certain period of time. Considering that number of n-grams is not constant within consecutive periods of time, SOM algorithm deploys methods for measuring distance between sequences presented in [24] . First testing results obtained in real environment demonstrate high potential of our approach.
Finally, our IDS will be implemented using the reconfigurable SORU architecture [21] developed by our group. SORU (Stream Oriented Reconfigurable Unit) is designed to be a reconfigurable co-processor especially suitable for run-time self-adaptation in environments with tight resource and power restrictions. In our first experiments using SOM algorithm it exhibited speedup of 1.77, while reducing energy consumption by 64% compared to a common RISC processor [39] . This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present an overview of the related work. Section 3 details the trust-based decision framework on which we establish our distributed model. Section 4 explains the process of feature extraction and formation of data model. Section 5 gives in more details the self-organizing map algorithm and its deployment in this work. In Section 6 we explain the way of detecting and mitigating intrusions. Section 7 presents the idea of distributed model. In Section 8 we detail the implementation of SOM using SORU architecture. Finally, we present the most important results in Section 9 and draw conclusions in Section 10.
Previous Work
Many different techniques have been deployed in order to guarantee security of WSNs. The most common techniques are encryption and authentication. Due to limited resources of sensor nodes it is not possible to deploy existing techniques. These problems have paved the way to the development of the specific encryption techniques that are suitable for WSN deployment. Some of them are proposed in [6] , [9] , [37] . However, although encryption solves problems of eavesdropping and authentication, we still have a problem if a node is compromised. In that case, the attacker possesses the secret key of a legitimate node, so it is able to authenticate itself to the rest of the nodes and access easily to any sensitive data. Even if the node is not compromised, remains the problem of side channel attacks [14] where the attacker can obtain the secret keys using side information, as the time it takes to perform certain operations, power consumption statistics, etc. Thus, the encryption when deployed without any supporting system is not able to provide high level of security of WSNs.
Other common techniques include secure routing protocols [38] , [4] , [2] , [27] , reputation-based framework [30] , secure data aggregation [10] , and secure time synchronization [31] . Yet, the main goal of these techniques is to preserve the integrity of the network in the presence of attackers, rather than detecting and eliminating them.
In the recent past few solutions for intrusion detection for WSNs have been proposed. The existing IDS solutions for general computer or even Ad Hoc networks could not have been deployed for WSNs' security since these solutions do not assume limited resources of computational units, so we will not compare our solution to any of these.
Thus, the main conclusion is that additional efforts have to be dedicated in designing intrusion detection systems that are compatible with the WSNs, above all in the terms of limited resources. Some of the solutions that propose general IDS schemes are given in [16] , [29] . However, to the best of our knowledge all the existing solutions are capable of detecting only limited number of attacks, i.e. known attacks and their variations. In order to detect new attacks, they need to be adjusted by human.
Recently few solutions that deploy machine learning techniques appeared [7] , [33] , [40] . These solutions uphold the idea that machine learning techniques offer higher level of flexibility and adaptability to the changes of the environment. However, these techniques consume significant resources. To the best of our knowledge, nobody has proposed any solution for this issue. Moreover, the feature sets they deploy mostly include those features whose values are known to change under the influence of an attacker, or are known to be weak spots. This is their major deficiency, as relying on these features only the known attacks or their variations can be detected. Furthermore, it assumes that an attacker can exploit only the known vulnerabilities, but general experience is that vulnerability is detected after being exploited by an adversary.
In this work we try to provide answers to the issues presented here. First of all, we deploy feature set that is capable of detecting attacks in general. In this way, our system is able to detect previously unseen attacks. Furthermore, we propose energy efficient implementation of our algorithm. Thus, our solution approaches the problem of the sensor network security in a more profound way than presented by the solutions of the state-of-the-art.
Trust-based Decision Framework
In our work we follow the definitions and beliefs of Boukerch et al. in [1] concerning the distinction between trust and reputation. Trust is the degree of belief about the future behavior of other entities. Furthermore, it is subjective and is based on past experiences. Reputation, on the other hand, is the global perception of an entity's behavior, and it is based on the trust that others hold on that entity. It is mostly objective and it has some influence in the evolution of trust in every node.
In this work we propose to couple a reputation system with SOM algorithm for detecting intrusions. Principally, SOM algorithm examines temporal and spatial coherence of the nodes, i.e. detects sharp changes that should not occur during the normal processing, and decreases the reputation values of nodes that exhibit suspicious behavior. In this way, the reaction of the intrusion detection system consist in assigning low reputation to suspicious nodes which renders them isolated from the rest of the network, as rest of the nodes will avoid any kind of interaction with low-reputation nodes. In the following text we will explain this approach in more details.
Our approach offers many advantages. Since it does not use reputation information from other nodes, it is resilient to bad-mouthing attack which is one of the most important vulnerabilities of standard reputation systems. Furthermore, it confines attacked nodes faster while relying on much lower node redundancy than standard reputation systems, which is demonstrated in our previous work [20] .
Feature Extraction and Formation of Model
In order to achieve efficient detection of intrusions, it is very important to model the behavior of the network (or its certain aspect) in such a way that the presence of an attack is distinguishable from the rest of the data. Furthermore, the data has to be captured and organized in a vector (i.e. feature) space with established distance (or similarity) function between two vectors in order to make possible the deployment of machine learning techniques.
At this point, we make the following reasonable assumption: considering the main purpose of sensor networks which consists in observing a phenomenon and taking measurements that further provide certain information about it, if an adversary wants to compromise the network, he/she will have to send wrong measurements to the base station in order to provide a false impression of the phenomenon. On the other hand, due to inherent redundancy, sensors provide data that is coherent in time and space. Hence, we believe that any kind of data inconsistence is probable to reveal the presence of an attacker. However, not any data inconsistence has to be related to adversarial activities, for example high temperature variation can be caused by fire or it can mean a broken sensor, but will be reported as an anomaly.
Hence, we establish our features as n-grams, i.e. sequences of sensor measurements of size n. We have two data models: temporal and spatial, which capture temporal and spatial consistence in data produced by each sensor or a group of close sensors. The value of each feature can be either its occurrence or its frequency during a predefined period of time. In this work, we will take the frequency value as this permits us to vary the period of time for which we can establish our model on the fly. Thus, the temporal model is established for each sensor. For example, the following sequence of outputs: 1 Each of the n-grams used to characterize the spatial model consists of the measurements of the corresponding group of sensors taken in different instances of time, in the way presented in Figure 1 . (S1, S2 and S3 are different sensors and the values given for each of them are the measurements sent in consecutive instances of time, n=3 in this case). The groups are formed of a certain predefined number of sensors in a way that each group overlaps with at least one more group. Before placing each sensor to a group, we have to get the confirmation from the server that the sensor really exists in the network. In this way, we avoid false anomaly reports.
Thus, the feature extraction process maps the space of possible sensor outputs to the highdimensional space of real number vectors. Formally, feature extraction process maps the space of sensor outputs ℑ (in most general case is the space of real numbers ℜ ) to a vector space
It is obvious that the cardinality of the set of possible vectors can be huge since each unit of an n-gram can assume any real number (the cardinality of the space is n ℜ ). However, given the expected coherence, in a realistic case this space is rather sparse i.e. ℑ is a small number, so we are not expecting to have to deal with high-cardinality vector spaces.
Self-Organizing Map Algorithm as Deployed
Self organizing maps (SOM) [28] , also known as Kohonen networks, are an unsupervised type of neural networks [18] , [32] . As in neural networks, the basic idea of SOM has origins in certain brain operations, specifically in projection of multidimensional inputs to one-dimensional or twodimensional neuronal structures on cortex. For example, perception of color depends on three different light receptors (red, green and blue), plus the eyes capture information about the position, size or texture of objects. It has been demonstrated that this multidimensional signal is processed by the planar cortex structure. Further, it has been demonstrated that the areas of the brain responsible for different signals from the body preserve topology, e.g. the area responsible for the signals that come from the arms is close to the area responsible for the signals that come from the hand. These are precisely the basic ideas of SOM that consist in the following:
1. Multidimensional data and their dependencies are presented and captured in a lower dimension SOM network (usually 2D).
2. The proximity of the nodes in SOM reflects similarity of the data mapped to the nodes.
For these reasons, SOMs have been widely deployed for clustering and good visualization of the problem. If we project the resulting clusters to RGB space, we can visualize the similarities of the adjacent clusters. They have been successfully deployed in different fields such as image processing [11] , robotics [22] (for both visual and motor functions), function approximation in mathematics [25] , network security [19] , detection of outliers in data [3] , etc.
In this work we rely on SOM's ability for detecting outliers [3] . When compared to standard density estimation methods (as kernel density estimator), SOMs are relatively fast and inexpensive when the dimensionality of the data is huge. Furthermore, SOMs do not significantly depend on the underlying model of data and have no restrictions concerning data dimensionality. This is very important in our case, as the dimensionality of our data model is variable and grows to be very high. …….
SOM Algorithm

Mathematical Background
If we define the function that transforms the space of sensor outputs to the feature space defined in the previous chapter as ( ) x φ , we can look at our SOM algorithm as kernel SOM algorithm [8] with ( ) x φ as mapping function. Thus, the kernel function in this case will be the following one:
where n ℑ is the space of all possible n-grams extracted from the space of sensor outputs ℑ .
Further, the winning rule is defined in the feature space as following:
where v stands for the winning node and mi are the node vectors of SOM lattice (here we choose to express . mi also in the feature space, so it can be written:
where n i, γ are constructing coefficients and x n are the SOM inputs, i.e. sensor outputs).
In order to generate the weight updating rule, we start from the energy function that should be minimized by the SOM algorithm [36] :
where Vi the Voronoi region of each SOM node, i.e. neuron i (j stands for the rest of the neurons) and h(i, j) is the SOM neighborhood function. The kernel SOM minimizes the previous energy, which leads to the following:
We omit neighborhood function from taking the partial differential since it does not contribute to the weight optimization, nor does the weight optimization lead to its adaptation, as observed in [15] . 
we derive:
Replacing (8) into (5) and using the steepest descent method [35] , we derive the following updating rule: 
Implemented Algorithm
Based on the mathematical background given previously and considering the flow of the SOM algorithm [28] , [34] , our implementation consists of the following steps:
1. The size of the grid is established, by which the number of the cluster is also known; the center of each cluster, i.e. grid node or SOM neuron, is implemented as a collection whose size is not fixed, i.e. can be changed on the fly, and whose elements are the n-grams defined in the previous text with assigned occurrence or frequency. Further, the number of iterations (N) is established. Afterwards, each cluster centre is initialized randomly. 2. A random instance x from the training data is chosen and its model ( ) where σ 0 stands for initial radius, λ is time constant and t is current iteration. In the beginning, σ(=σ 0 ) is quite high, it almost covers the grid, but it decreases during the time (with the time constant λ).
Every node, i.e. cluster center that resides in σ-
neighborhood of the BMU is adjusted in the way given in the formula (9) (12) where dist stands for the distance between the current winning node (BMU or v(x)) and the node (i) whose center is being updated.
Given the feature extraction function ( )
is obvious that the current node and the current input do not necessarily need to have the same features. We overcome this problem by adding the non-existing features to both of them with the value equal to 0. Hence, if the node center does not have certain n-gram from the input, the n-gram will be added to the center with the value calculated according to the formula (9) with the old value equal to 0. In the similar fashion, if the current input does not contain certain n-gram from the center, we take 0 to be its value and proceed with the formula (9). 6. Steps 2-5 are repeated until all the instances from the training set are chosen. 7. Steps 2-6 are repeated N times.
Deployed Distance Function
The distance between the instances of the presented model is taken from [24] . It is designed to calculate the distance between two sequences. We have elected this one (among all given in [24] ) since it is proven to be the most efficient in the terms of the absolute execution time. In the following we give the pseudo code for calculating distance in our model. Thus, the first step consists in extracting the ngrams from two sequences X and Y; the next step is to sort them according the n-grams. Finally, we pass them to the function COMPARE where val[x] stands for the feature value (either occurrence or frequency, as explained in the previous text) and the distance function d in this work is Mahalanobis distance.
1: function COMPARE(X Y
: Array) : R 2: s e i 1 j 1 3: whilei ≤ X or j ≤ Y do 4: x X[i ] y Y [ j ] 5: if y NIL or n-gram[x] n-gram[y] then 6: s s d val[x]0 7: i i 1 8: else if x NIL or n-gram [x] n-gram [y] then 9: s s d 0 val[y] 10: j j 1 11: else 12: s s d val[x] val[y] 13: i i 1 j j 1 14: return s
Detection of Intrusions
The proper functioning of our IDS is based on the following two important assumptions:
1. The adversary can capture only limited number of nodes, which means that most of the output data produced by the sensor nodes is normal. If this is not the case, it means that the adversary can subvert any protocol in the network, which would require for the network re-initialization. 2. Output data produced under the influence of an adversary are statistically different form the output produced during the normal operation of the network. For this reason, we establish the detection of anomalies in data as outlier detection (the definition of outliers is rather fuzzy, but it is considered that an outlier is an observation that lies an "abnormal" distance from other values in a random sample from a population, in other words extreme points in the data cloud). If any of these assumptions is not fulfilled, our model is not able to work properly.
As mentioned before, we treat attacks as data outliers. There are two possible approaches for detecting outliers using SOM algorithm depending on the following two possibilities: detecting outlying nodes or detecting outlying data that belong to nonoutlying nodes. For the first case, we calculate the average distance of each node to the rest of the nodes (or its closest neighborhood) (MD). In the later case, we calculate quantization error (QE) of each input as the distance from its group center. Mathematically it can be expresses in the following way: ( ) where v(x) is the winging node given in formula (2) , N is the number of the nodes in the SOM lattice and m i are the node centers.
Hence, a node whose average distance is greater than those of the rest of the nodes is considered to be outlying node and all the inputs that belong to it are considered to be anomalies. On the other hand, even if the node to which the current input belongs is not outlying, e.g. outlying data is too sparse so the formation of outlying node(s) is not possible, if its QE value is greater than the rest of the QE values from the same node, i.e. from the medium QE of the node established during the training it is considered to be the proof of the anomaly of the current input.
There are many important advantages that this proposal offers. On the one hand, we avoid time consuming and error prone process of collecting only normal data for SOM training if we want to establish a normal behavior and detect attacks as deviations from the established normal behavior. On the other hand, we could train SOM with all the collected data and then label the resulting clusters in a certain way (for example, we can say that the cluster to which the most of the data belong is the "normal" one, while the rest are intrusive, or measure its "intrusiveness" as the distance from the "normal" one). But, this approach has many flaws, as it can happen that a new intrusion is more similar to the normal data than any of the intrusive ones, so it would falsely be labeled as normal, while our QE measurement is more probable to work in this case.
Reputation by SOM
Based on the previous definitions of anomaly index, we define the reputation of SOM in the following way:
1. We limit the reputation values to the range [0, 1], where 0 is the lowest possible, meaning that there is no confidence in the node, and 1 the highest possible, meaning the absolute confidence in the node. 2. We define two reputation values for each sensor node, repQE and repMD based on previously defined QE and MD values:
where maxMD_value is the maximum median distance for the current SOM lattice and anoScMed is the MD value for the best matching unit of the current input.
In this way, repMD takes values between 0 and 1, where the nodes that are close to the rest (or its proximate vicinity, depending on the definition) have higher reputation and vice versa. Regarding QE value, during the training we calculate the median QE for all the nodes in the corresponding SOM lattice. In the testing process, we calculate QE value for the corresponding input and calculate repQE as the ratio of current QE and the median QE for its corresponding best matching unit node (or vice versa in order to maintain repQE value between 0 and 1). Finally, according to the intuitive reasoning (based on the fact that if the data produced by the presence of an intruder form their own node, it will be significantly distant from the rest; on the other hand, if these data are too sparse and thus not able to form their own group, they will end up belonging to the "normal" nodes, so we have to calculate their QE value), we establish the following manner to calculate current reputation:
where we take 0.5 as threshold because it is the median value between 0 and 1.
Finally, we update the reputation of the node in the following way: If the final value is greater than 1, we truncate it to 1, and in the similar fashion if it is lower than 0, we truncate it to 0. The function x+log(0.99*x) is presented in Fig. 2 and provides exactly what we want to achieve: falling of the cumulative reputation if we have small current reputation values and vice versa, and also small changes in the reputation if we are around 0.5. As it can be observed, for the values lower than the 0.3 the values the reputation will fall down quickly, while for the values higher than 0.65 the function rises significantly. Finally, for the values Both temporal and spatial SOM algorithms calculate the reputation of each node in the way explained in the previous text. The final reputation of the node by SOM algorithm is calculated as follows:
Bearing in mind that the spatial SOM assigns the reputation to groups (that is further assigned to each of the nodes that belong to the group), but not all the nodes in a group are necessarily ill-behaved, we take this value with lower coefficient. Hence, the coefficient c is higher than 0.5.
Distributed IDS Model
Distributed Organization of Agents
We adopt the idea of immune systems [17] in order to establish the distributed model of our detector. In the beginning we have a group of agents based on the SOM algorithm. Every sensor node is being examined by a SOM agent that resides on a node in its vicinity and listens to its communication in a promiscuous manner. Each of the agents is trained separately, which resembles the basic idea of immune systems: all the processes of detector (agent in our case) generation and elimination of antibodies, i.e. intruders, are parallel and distributed [17] .
The system of SOM agents is coupled with a reputation system where each node has its reputation value that basically reflects the level of confidence that others have in it based on its previous behavior. In our proposal, the output of the SOM agent affects on the reputation system in the way that it assigns lower reputation to the nodes where it detects adversarial activities and vice versa. We further advocate coupling the information provided by the reputation system with routing protocol in the way that the nodes with low reputation should not be considered as a routing hop and all the information coming from these nodes should be discarded. In this way, the compromised node remains isolated from the network and has no role in its further functioning. Considering that the attacker that has taken over a node can disable or compromise the SOM agent, we introduce agent redundancy: at least two SOM agents will examine the behavior of each node and both will affect on its reputation.
Additionally, we assign reputation to each detector. We have opted for beta reputation [30] , since it has strong background in the theory of statistics. It is calculated according to the following formula:
Beta E R (15) where α stands for the number of correct decisions made by the detector, while β stands for the number of the incorrect ones. The voting system decides whether a response is right or wrong based on majority voting. The algorithm for calculating reputation of the detectors together with the voting systems is executed in the base station.
Each agent has to pass through a period of validation: if after a certain period of time its reputation is above the established threshold value, the agent can participate in the detection process. The validation process resembles the process of maturation of the lymphocytes in the immune system. Once a detector from the immune system detects an antigen, it activates the substances that eliminate the antigen. In a similar fashion, once a validated agent in our detector identifies a compromised node, it decreases its reputation which will render it isolated from the network.
This approach has many advantages. First of all, SOM algorithm does not use reputation values from the neighborhood, which makes it robust to bad mouthing attack, the main problem of reputation systems. Further, it can make the model of data for training and testing on the fly, so it is not necessary to provide the storage for great amounts of data. Finally, one of the most important advantages of this solution is its scalability. Namely, the addition of new nodes in the network requires activation of new agents that will run on the nodes in its vicinity and examine their behavior. As a comparison, if we choose to execute all the agents on the base station, the addition of new nodes (which implies addition of new detection agents) introduces extra charge to the base station that could lead to the deterioration of its functionality. Thus, it is obvious that our solution provides much better scalability.
Envisioned WSN Model
We envision wireless sensor networks (Fig.3) where most of the sensor nodes exhibit limited resources, but there are also a number of PDA-like sensors with more computational resources, memory and battery capacity. Their number is significantly smaller than the number of the "normal" sensors, usually few orders of magnitude smaller. The nodes can organize themselves either in a hierarchical or flat manner. In this way, there are various possibilities of incorporation of our detection system in the proposed WSN model:
− Training of agents can be performed in either the base station or the PDA-like sensors and already trained agents are further distributed to all the nodes. Since the detection process does not consume many resources, trained agents can be executed even in the sensors with limited resources. Furthermore, in our previous work [20] we have proven that our system needs lower level of redundancy than the standard reputation systems, thus most of the sensors can remain in sleep mode. − Both training and detection of intrusions are performed in PDA-like sensors that are supposed to have enough resources to carry out these operations. In this way the rest of the sensors are not affected by the incorporation of our system.
− Finally, addition of one or more SORU coprocessors (explained in the following chapter) or a similar co-processor to the main processor of each sensor would make it possible to perform both training and detection of intrusions in all the sensor nodes. Again, since there is no need for high redundancy for our system to function properly, most of the sensors can remain in sleep mode.
SORU Implementation
The implementation of the proposed solution has to accomplish certain requirements imposed by the nature of the sensor networks on one side and the intrusion detection problem on the other. As previously mentioned, sensor units contain very limited power and computational resources, thus the implementation of the proposed solution has to have low consumption. On the other hand, new forms of attacks are emerging every day, so an intrusion detection system has to be highly adaptable and flexible.
FPGA devices are a possible solution for implementation, since they can be reconfigured dynamically and thus makes a device for intrusion detection more flexible and adaptable. Dynamic reconfiguration provides adaptation at runtime to the changing environment, thus enabling faster response to these changes. In the case when we deal with unknown intrusions that appear on a daily basis, this characteristic is very important since it provides faster response to these intrusions and impedes their further spreading.
However, FPGAs exhibit high power consumption and had to be discarded. DSPs are another attractive solution, as they exhibit higher performance due to the fact that they work with vector rather than scalar data, which can be beneficial in our case. Finally, we have opted for the SORU architecture, i.e. adding SORU co-processor (one or more) to the main processor, as it joins the benefits of both FPGAs and DSPs. Its architecture is dynamically reconfigurable, which makes it highly adaptable; it also works with vector data, but the processes as loop extraction and memory access are more straightforward in SORU. What's more, it has been demonstrated that SORU coprocessor can decrease the total consumption of the main processor up to 80% [21] . Thus, this implementation fulfils all the requirements stated above. 
SORU Architecture
The SORU RFU [21] has been originally designed as an extension to the execution stage of a classical MIPS-like RISC processor. A vector load/store unit, integrated into the execution unit of the main processor, decouples operand fetch of SORU operations from the normal processor operation. It allows feeding of the SORU RFU with up to four independent in-memory vectors, and storing the results in data memory with no further intervention from the main datapath. This feature lets the processor execute any non memory-dependent data processing at the same time the SORU unit is executing a complex vector operation. The main goal is to make it easy for external applications to extract complete loops to be executed in the SORU RFU.
The SORU functional unit is a 32 bit dynamically reconfigurable datapath (Fig.4) . It provides all the specific hardware needed to speed-up program critical operations. The most prominent features of the SORU RFU are:
− It provides a flexible dynamically reconfigurable pipeline, with multiple configuration contexts, that can be easily configured to chain a large number of vectororiented operations. − An internal general purpose register file reduces the coupling with the main datapath and helps to reduce memory accesses. − The whole operation execution control is embedded into the SORU functional unit, so the main processor is free to do other tasks.
Implementation of the Proposed SOM Algorithm using SORU
The main idea consists in identifying complicated loops that take most of the execution time and implement them in SORU. We have multiple reasons for doing so. First of all, we avoid multiple FETCH instructions, as SORU is an SIMD-type processor and it performs the same function on multiple data. Second of all, due to SORU architecture we achieve software pipelining without having to use as many additional registers as a general purpose processor does. Due to these characteristics of SORU we can achieve much higher performance compared to a single processor. Finally, the corresponding context which will define the configuration of BRUs (Basic Reconfigurable Unit) is resolved.
In the first step we have we have deployed gcov [12] and gprof [13] tools in order to identify the part of the code that takes most of the execution time. In our case, we were able to identify the three functions that are often called in the program and for that reason take 90% of the execution time. All of them consist in searching a certain element within a list of unknown size. The elements are identified by a string whose size does not exceed 10 characters. Thus, it takes up to four 32-bit registers (out of 32) that exist in SORU to store each string, so each of the BRUs can be deployed as a 32-bit equality comparator. This case is especially suitable for a SORU implementation, as we can perform up to four comparisons in a cycle.
Evaluation of the Proposed System
Simulation Environment
The proposed algorithm has been tested on a simulator of sensor networks developed by our research group and designed using the C++ programming language. We have decided to design a simulator mainly because there is no available testbed for security applications in sensor networks. Attacking recorded data from a testbed does not significantly differ from the simulation. What's more, the available testbeds for wireless sensor networks contain relatively small number of sensors (100 at most), in which case the data obtained from our simulator are more complex (simply because there are more sensors). For these reasons, we believe that until a testbed for security applications in WSNs appears, a simulator is a better choice for testing the applications. We further evaluated two well-known WSN simulators, ns-2 [26] and Castalia [5] over Omnet++. Yet, we eventually decided to implement our own simulator, AmiSim. This simulator focuses on the logical aspect of the problem, therefore reducing the total simulation time, which was our main reason for implementing the simulator. In the following we will describe the characteristics of the simulator that are important for understanding the results of this work.
The configuration of the network is defined by the block Scenario which defines the number of sensors, their position in the network area, and the range of their radio signal. Block World defines the surrounding of the network. The initial value that each node "senses" is read from a file, while the values that follow are defined by the block DataType that establishes the type of data the sensors send, its range and maximal variation between two successive outputs. There are two types of servers and one policy: NameServer, where all the active nodes are registered, ReputationServer that implements various ways of calculating reputation and RoutingPolicy than can implement various routing protocols.
For the purpose of simulation, the proposed SOM algorithm is an implementation of ReputationServer. The attacks are implemented as changes in some of the blocks mentioned above, altering in that way the normal behavior of the network. Thus, due to its fast simulation time and the easiness of simulating attacks, AmiSim is a better choice for testing logical aspects of detection algorithms over the conventional simulators.
Results and Discussion
The proposed algorithm has been tested on a simulated sensor network that contains 2000 sensor nodes attacked by a Sybil attack [23] . We have chosen Sybil due to its aggressiveness and elusiveness. Moreover, most of the internal attacks (thief, mole, clone etc.) can be considered as special cases of Sybil. The network simulates a sensor network for detection of presence in the area of application. In other words, sensors give either output 1 if they detect presence of a person or an object, or 0 if they do not detect any presence.
The groups for the spatial SOM algorithm are formed in the following way: close sensors that should give the same output are placed in the same group. This is concluded from the historical information, i.e. the sensors that give the same output during longer periods of time. Having a spatial characterization is beneficial if we have high activity in the region of sensor deployment, where having only temporal characterization might not detect a suspicious behavior of a separate sensor, while its inconsistent behavior within the group will be easily detected.
In the general case, the vicinity for each agent consists of the nodes that are directly accessible from the agent and that give coherent information during time. In this case, the vicinity is defined by the base station or the PDA-like nodes. However, if the training is to be performed in all the nodes, they do not have enough memory to store enough historical information in order to precisely identify the vicinity, so the vicinity in this case consist of all directly accessible nodes. The level of vicinity also depends on where the agent is residing. Higher levels of vicinity require larger storage capacity and vice versa, so if the agent is residing on a standards sensor with limited resources, the group consists of 4-10 sensors, while in the case of PDA-like sensors this number can be some 10 times higher.
In our experiments the Sybil attack impersonates 100 sensor identifications. The duration of the experiment is 2500 time ticks. One time tick in the simulator is the period of time required to perform the necessary operations in the network. The data for the training of the SOM algorithm is collected during the first 1000 time ticks. The Sybil is launched in the 1150 th time tick from the sensor that resides on the position 370. The weight c in the following experiments is 0.9. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the reputation of every node after and before introducing the Sybil attack. The Y-axis represents time whereas X-axis indicates space. Z-axis shows reputation values and it is represented by color gradation. As we can observe, the reputation of the neighbors of the Sybil node (distinguishing stripe at position 370) are not significantly affected and all the attacked nodes have their reputation significantly decreased (demonstrated as black stripes on Fig.5 ) rendering them isolated from the network.
In Fig. 6 we present the evolution of detection process. In our case, real positives are well-behaved nodes, while real negatives are the ill-behaved nodes. Fake positives are non-detected ill-behaved nodes, while fake negatives represent the portion of wellbehaved nodes necessary to confine the attack. As we can see, all ill-behaved nodes have been detected (the percentage of fake positives decreases to 0). Finally, we have tested our system against a Sybil attack launched after a bad-mouthing attack. Since the proposed algorithm does not include reputation propagation between the nodes, it is not expected to see any influence on the final results. The following experiment proves this assumption. The experiment involves a badmouthing Sybil node that attacks the system. The scenario of the experiment consists of 22 badmouthing nodes in a small region and, after a while, a Sybil node that adopts the identities of the badmouthing nodes. The attack decreases the reputation of a group of nodes surrounding the attacker. When their reputation is down enough, information from the Sybil identifiers will be used for the decisions. For this reason, in common reputation systems, due to the low reputation of these nodes, the fact that they have detected suspicious behavior will not affect significantly on the reputation of ill-behaved nodes, which results in slower attack confinement. This was demonstrated in our previous work [20] . However, as we can observe on Fig. 7 , the bad-mouthing does not affect on our system, as there is no decrease of reputation in the neighborhood of Sybil nodes and we detect and banish the Sybil attack. 
Performance of SORU Implementation
The SOM algorithm is implemented using one SORU co-processor added to the main processor, as explained in the previous chapter. The resulting implementation has a global speedup of 1.77 mainly due to the identifiers being stored in internal SORU registers and the 3.7x speedup in the search loops because the SORU pipeline performs 4 operations simultaneously, if possible. But the most interesting result is the reduction in power consumption. The dynamic power consumption due to instruction fetches is reduced by 64%, and the power consumption due to data memory accesses is also reduced by 31%. As it is common in microprocessorbased digital systems, it is assumed that the main sources of power consumption are the operating time and the memory access. Besides, the number of consecutive accesses to data memory increases significantly, what leads to an additional power reduction in the memory buses, by reducing the activity in the address bus, and also in the data memory, by avoiding pre-charges. Hence, we have proven that it is reasonable to deploy SORU coprocessors in order to provide low power consumption of our algorithm.
Conclusions
In this work we have presented a novel approach for detecting intrusions in wireless sensor networks. We have proposed an unsupervised machine learning SOM algorithm for detecting outliers in data that deploys a feature set that is more general than those presented by the solutions of the state-of-the-art.
The idea is based on assigning reputation values to the nodes according to the decision of the SOM algorithm. Hence, the response to attacks of our IDS consists in assigning low reputation to malicious nodes which will render them isolated from the network and impede them to further propagate their malicious activity. We have further proposed a distributed system of agents that scales properly with network expansion. SOM agents are coupled with a reputation system, where they assign low reputation values to compromised nodes, and vice versa rendering them isolated from the rest of the network. Finally, we have proposed an energy efficient implementation.
In our experiments we have demonstrated that our system is capable of detecting and confining a Sybil attack, which is one of the most aggressive and elusive attacks. We have also proven that our system is not vulnerable to bad-mouthing attack, which is one of the main drawbacks of common reputation systems.
In the future we plan to add more attacks to our attack simulator. In addition, we plan to expand our feature set with routing information and thus provide the possibility to detect the attacks that exploit the deficiencies of routing protocols.
